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1. The syntactic mass-count distinction 
 
The mass-count distinction is a morpho-syntactic distinction among nouns that is generally 
taken to have semantic content. This content is generally taken to reflect a conceptual, 
cognitive, or ontological distinction and relates to philosophical and cognitive notions of 
unity, identity, and counting. The mass-count distinction is certainly one of the most 
interesting and puzzling topics in syntax and semantics that bears on ontology and cognitive 
science. In many ways, the topic remains under-researched, though, across languages and 
with respect to particular phenomena within a given language, with respect to its connection 
to cognition, and with respect to the way it may be understood ontologically. This volume 
aims to contribute to some of the gaps in the research on the topic, in particular the relation 
between the syntactic mass-count distinction and semantic and cognitive distinctions, 
diagnostics for mass and count, the distribution and role of numeral classifiers, abstract mass 
nouns, and object mass nouns (furniture, police force, clothing).  
     In what follows, I will present the classical view about the mass-count distinction, which is 
mainly based on English (and related European languages) as well as Chinese. It provides the 
background to the contributions of the volume, some of which present serious challenges of 
that view, in particular from recent crosslinguistic research. 
   There are a range of criteria for the syntactic mass-count distinction.
1
 Foremost is the 
inability of mass nouns to participate in a singular-plural distinction. Mass nouns do not come 
with a plural (unless, of course, they have been turned into count nouns, with a corresponding 
change in meaning):
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1 See, for example, Pelletier (1979b), Bunt (1985), Link (1983), Doetjes (2012), Gillon (1992), Rothstein (1910, 
2017). 
2 Exceptions are ‘plurale tantum’ such as belongings or shavings, which are mass nouns taking the form of 
plurals. 
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(1)       a. apple,  
b. rice, * rices  
 
Mass nouns also trigger singular agreement of the verb, whereas count nouns trigger singular 
or plural agreement. 
    A second criterion is the inability of mass nouns to allow for cardinal and ordinal numerals: 
 
(2)      a. ten apples  
b. * ten rice  
(3)      a. the first / second tree 
b. * the first / second wood 
 
Furthermore, unlike count nouns, mass nouns do not allow count quantifiers such as few and 
many, but take mass quantifiers such as much and little, which are excluded for cunt nouns: 
 
(4)      a. few / many pears 
b. * a few rice / many rice 
c. too much / too little apples 
d. too much / too little rice 
 
Moreover, unlike singular count nouns, mass nouns disallow singular quantifiers every, each, 
and a: 
 
(5)      a. every / each / a cherry 
b. * every / each / a rice 
 
    Generally, mass quantifiers are taken to have a different semantics than count quantifiers. 
That is, many, few and a and the mass quantifiers much, little, and some do not just differ in 
syntactic category. 
      Another standard criterion for the mass-count distinction is that NPs do not permit one-
anaphora, unlike singular count NPs: 
 
(6)       a. John ate a cherry, and Bill ate one too/ *some too  
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b. John ate rice, and Bill ate *one too/ some too 
 
     There are also some lesser known lexical semantic criteria that distinguish mass and count 
nouns.  One of them is that predicates of size or shape are inapplicable to mass nouns when 
targeting the entire quantity, and that in adnominal and predicative position (Rothstein 2010, 
Schwarzschild 2011):
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(7)       a. ?? the round wood 
b. the round piece of wood 
c. ?? the large water 
d. the large amount of water 
(8)      a. ?? The wood (ok The piece of wood) was round. 
b. ?? The water (ok The amount of water) was large. 
 
Predicates of size and shape are applicable to certain types of mass nouns, namely object mass 
nouns such as furniture and luggage, nouns whose denotations consist in pluralities of 
individuals (or ‘atoms’). However, predicates of size and shape have only a distributive 
reading with object mass nouns, applying to the individuals that make up the denotation of 
those mass nouns. (9a, b) are acceptable as long as round and large apply to individual pieces 
of furniture or luggage:  
 
(9)       a. round furniture 
b. large luggage 
 
(9a, b) fail to have a ‘collective’ reading with round and large applying to the maximal 
quantity of furniture or luggage. 
    Another lesser known lexical semantic criterion for the mass-count distinction consists in 
that number-related verbs, as one may call them, are inapplicable to mass nouns. First, the 
verb count hardly applies to mass NPs, as opposed to plural count NP (Moltmann 1997, chap. 
3.3.2.): 
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 The same holds for definite plurals. Thus (i) cannot mean that the group or plurality of children is large 
(Moltmann 2004, p. 766). 
 
(i) The children are large. 
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(10)     a. ??? John counted the wood. 
b. John counted the pieces of wood. 
 
The same holds for outnumber and the adjective numerous: 
 
(11)    a. ?? John’s luggage outnumbers Mary’s. 
b. John’s pieces of luggage outnumber Mary’s.  
(12)     a. ?? The luggage is numerous. 
b. The pieces of luggage are numerous. 
 
Second, the verb rank does not apply to mass NPs, but only to plural NPs (Moltmann 1997, 
chap. 3, 3.2.): 
 
(13)     a. ??? John ranked the decoration / the carpeting. 
b. John ranked the pieces of decoration / the carpets. 
 
This matches the semantic behavior of ordinal numerals such as first, second. The same holds 
for the related verbs list and enumerate (Moltmann 1997, chap. 3, 3.2.): 
 
(14)     a. ??? John listed the clothing. 
b. John listed the pieces of clothing. 
(15)    a. ??? Mary enumerated the weakness of the paper. 
b. Mary enumerated the points of weakness of the paper. 
 
Lexical generalizations of this sort indicate that object mass nouns differ from plural nouns 
not only syntactically but also semantically. 
     Mass nouns have the general ability to undergo syntactic shifts to count nouns, with 
corresponding shifts in meaning. Typical count uses of mass nouns are those with a standard 
packaging reading (16a) and a taxonomic reading (16b): 
 
(16)     a. John ordered three waters. (servings)  
b. This region produces two wines. (types)  
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Conversely, certain count nouns can be converted into mass nouns, with a shift in meaning 
due to what has been called ‘the universal grinder’ (Pelletier 1979b): 
 
(17) John put some apple in the salad. 
.  
There is certainly a connection between an individual and the quantity (matter) it is made of. 
How the connection is to be understood is a topic of controversy in philosophy (with some 
philosophers maintaining identity, others difference between the two). Certainly, for the 
semantics of the count-mass shift that a noun like apple may undergo a function is needed 
mapping an individual to the matter that constitutes it (Pelletier, 1979b, Link 1983). 
     The notion of a singular count noun is closely related to the philosophically important 
notion of a sortal, a predicate that provides identity conditions for entities (and allows 
reidentification over time or in different circumstances) (Grandy 2007, Pelletier 1979a). The 
notions of a sortal and of a count noun do not coincide. Pile, collection, and quantity, for 
example, are singular count nouns, but not sortals. 
    
 
2. Approaches to the semantic mass-count distinction 
 
Two sorts of approaches to the content of the mass-count distinction can be distinguished:  
[1] the extensional mereological approach (which can be traced to Quine 1960)  
[2] the integrity-based approach (which can be traced to Jespersen 1924). 
     The first approach distinguishes singular count, plural and mass nouns in terms of 
properties of their extensions, which are generally formulated in terms of extensional 
mereology (Link 1983, Krifka 1989, Ojeda 1993, Champollion / Krifka 2017, Champollion 
2017).
4
 Mass nouns, it is generally agreed, have extensions that are cumulative, that is, the 
fusion of two elements in the extension of a mass noun N is again in the extension of N 
(Quine 1960). Cumulativity, though, obtains also for the extension of plural nouns.  
Divisiveness has been proposed as a distinguishing property of mass noun extensions; that is, 
for any element x in the extension of a mass noun N a proper part of x is again in the 
extension of N (Chang 1973). Cumulativity and divisiveness together define homogeneity. 
                                                             
4
 Theories that take mass nouns to be inherently plural (Gillon 1992, Chierchia 1998) can be subsumed under the 
extensional mereological approach broadly understood. Chierchia (2015) gives an epistemic version of the 
extensional mereological  approach. Rothstein (2017) makes use of extensional mereology, but relativizes the 
denotation of count nouns to a context, mainly because of nouns of the sort fence. 
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Divisiveness, however, is problematic in that it raises the minimal-parts problem for all mass 
nouns (Bunt 1985). It is particularly implausible for object mass nouns, such as furniture, 
police force, luggage, personnel, hardware. Object mass nouns form a rather large class in 
English, and they challenge extensional mereological characterizations of mass nouns. 
Singular count nouns are generally characterized as atomic; that is, no element x in the 
extension of an atomic noun N has a proper part that is again in the extension of N.  
     The semantic peculiarity of object mass nouns also manifests itself in comparisons: more 
wine involves measurement of quantities, whereas more furniture is generally evaluated in 
terms of pieces, rather than, say volume (Barner / Snedeker 2005). The latter, though, does 
not hold when the functionality of the individuals plays less of a role (more fruit can be 
evaluated by volume as well as by pieces). For the semantics of mass nouns in general, two 
different sorts of measure functions need to be distinguished: extensive (additive) measure 
functions for dimensions such as weight and volume and intensive (non-additive) measure 
functions for dimensions such as heat (Lønning 1987, Krifka 1998, Tovena 2001). 
    Atomicity, given the extensional mereological approach, is widely assumed to be the 
defining semantic feature of singular count nouns. But there are a range of counterexamples to 
it. Nouns such as entity, object, and sum are not atomic, permitting proper parts of elements in 
their extension to be in their extension again (Moltmann 1997 p. 19). This also holds for 
nouns like fence, wall, string, twig, stone, fence (Rothstein 2010, 2017).  Let me call this the 
‘divisiveness problem’ for count nouns. 
     The extensional mereological account also faces limitations in that particular quantities or 
pluralities may display a semantically relevant division into substructures, often based on 
linguistically provided information. Thus, (18a) has a distributive reading on which different 
subgroups of students gathered and (18b) one on which John compares the jewelry in one box 
to the jewelry in another box for the different boxes: 
 
(18)     a. The students gathered. 
b. John compared the jewelry in the boxes. 
 
Such readings require augmenting the semantics of plurals and mass nouns with contextually 
given partitions (Gillon 1987, Moltmann 1997, chap. 2-3).  
      The second approach to the semantic mass-count distinction distinguishes mass nouns and 
count nouns in terms of properties of entities in their extensions, such as having a boundary or 
integrity of some sort, a notion that goes back to Aristotelian notion of form (Simons 1987). A 
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version of the approach can be found already in Jespersen’s (1924) characterization of mass 
nouns: “There are a great many words which do not call up the idea of some definite thing 
with a certain shape or precise limits. I call these ‘mass-words’; they may be either material, 
in which case they denote some substance in itself independent of form, such as silver, 
quicksilver, water, butter, gas, air, etc., or else immaterial, such as leisure, music, traffic, 
success, tact, commonsense” (Jespersen, 1924, p. 198). Another version of the approach has 
been proposed within cognitive linguistics by Langacker (1987), who makes use of the notion 
of a boundary. 
      A situation-based version of the integrity-based approach has been developed in 
Moltmann (1997, 1998). On that view, count nouns are taken to characterize entities as 
integrated wholes of one sort of another in situations of reference, whereas mass nouns 
specify entities as not being integrated wholes in situations of reference. The second approach 
does not face the divisiveness problem, since it does not make use of the notion of an atom for 
the characterization of singular count nouns. For some count nouns, such as entity, object, and 
part the integrity will have to come from the nonlinguistic context (e.g. connected in space) 
(Moltmann 1997, p. 22f).  The situation-based version permits subgroups or subquantities to 
have integrity in situations of reference, setting up another level of structure (higher-level 
plurality) besides the one imposed by the noun itself. 
     The second approach may be considered unsatisfactory because of the vagueness of the 
notion of integrity. There are more substantial difficulties for the view when applying it to 
count nouns such as amount, patch, or collection and when applying it to the semantics of 
pairs like clothes – clothing, coins-change, shoes-footwear. Certainly, the approach has the 
same difficulties dealing with object mass nouns as the extensional mereological approach, 
unless he notion of situation is modified allowing it not to represent entities with their 
individuating structure (Moltmann 1997, p. 21). 
     There is something unsatisfactory about both approaches to the mass-count distinction and 
that is that both take quantities and pluralities to be single entities which make up the 
extension of mass nouns and plural nouns respectively. If they are single entities, then those 
entities should be countable, which they aren’t. Quantities and pluralities can never be 
counted as ‘one’. Thus, (19a, b) cannot have readings on which the verb count targets 
(contextually individuated) subquantities or subgroups: 
 
(19)      a. ?? John counted the jewelry. (meaning: counted heaps of jewelry) 
 b. ?? John counted the students. (meaning: counted the groups of students). 
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The fact that pluralities and quantities never count as one in the context of the semantics of 
natural language is something that mereological approaches don’t seem to give justice to 
(whether based on extensional mereology or mereology with integrity conditions). For plurals, 
the recent approach of plural reference avoids the problem by taking pluralities to be 
‘collections as many’ rather than ‘collections as one’, to use Russell’s phrase; that is, on that 
approach, the students refers plurally to each student at once, rather than referring to a single 
thing that is a plurality (sum or set) (Oliver/Smiley 2013, Moltmann 2017). 
 
 
3. Numeral classifiers 
 
Numeral classifiers are a category of expressions that have an individuating function, making, 
it seems, counting and quantifying possible (Cheng / Sybesma 1999, Borer 2005, Doetjes 
2012, Rothstein 2017). They play an important role in classifier languages such as Chinese, 
which lacks a syntactic mass-count distinction. At the same time, recent research shows that 
the presence of classifiers in a language does not strictly go along with the absence of a mass-
count distinction, and vice versa. Classifier languages include most East and Southeast Asian 
languages, some Australian aboriginal languages and some native American languages. In 
general, in classifier languages numerals are obligatorily followed by a classifier that indicates 
the semantic class of the host noun (Allan 1977, Downing 1996, Senft 2000, Aikhenvald 
2003). Classifiers often convey properties of shape, as in the Mandarin Chinese examples 
below: 
 
(20)    a. yi zhang zhi/lian/chuang  
                           one CL-flat paper/face/bed 
b. yi tiao shengzi/she  
                            one CL-long-thin rope/snake 
 
A common view is that all nouns in classifier languages are mass or better number-neutral, 
which means that entities in the extension of nouns in those languages can be counted only in 
virtue of the presence of a unit-specifying classifier.   
     Generally two sorts of classifiers are distinguished: sortal classifiers and mensural 
classifiers (Lyons 1977, Doetjes 2012). A sortal classifier is a classifier which specifies units 
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in terms of types of entities (sorts), whereas a mensural classifier is a classifier which specifies 
units in terms of quantities. Sortal classifiers actualise individuation condition already 
belonging to the concept to which they apply, making them linguistically visible (Bisang 
1999). Mensural classifiers create units by applying external scales. In English, measure 
phrases such as one slice in one slice of bread and three cups in three cups of milk have the 
function of mensural classifiers (Lehrer 1986). 
     Classifiers come in a range of categorisation devices, which differ, among other things, in 
their grammatical status, degree of grammaticalisation, meaning, and conditions of use 
(Aikhenvald 2003). In some languages, classifiers are morphemes or words that select nouns 
or verbs in syntactic constructions for counting or quantifying entities. Classifiers can also be 
noun categorisation devices that are syntactically associated with verbs but categorise nominal 
subjects or objects.  
     Classifiers in classifier languages require more complex syntactic structures of noun 
phrases. One recent proposal is that of Zhang (2013). Besides the functional projections 
NumP representing number and QuantP hosting quantifiers, Zhang takes the structure below 
DP to contain a unit phrase UnitP, which ensures the applicability of a numeral, as well as a 
delimitative phrase DelP, which conveys delimiting information related to size and shape. 
Another influential proposal regarding the syntax of classifier phrases is that of Borer (2005). 
Borer’s proposal goes beyond classifier languages and takes nouns to be number-neutral even 
in languages like English. Borer posits a functional head ind for numeral classifier phrases, 
which is present both in Chinese classifier constructions and in English measure phrases. Ind 
moreover serves to host singular and plural morphology in languages with a mass-count 
distinction such as English, where nouns are now considered number-neutral.  Borer’s view is 
not uncontroversial, though, since there are languages that allow classifiers to go together 
with count syntax. The syntactic structure of classifier systems and the generalizations they 
are based on continues to be a widely debated topic in syntax. Of particularly interest in the 
general debate is the variation of classifier languages that there are and that may behave rather 
differently from Chinese. 
 
 
4. Contributions in this volume 
 
The mass-count distinction and the related topic of classifier languages raise a range of 
questions that the articles in this volume will contribute to.  
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   One general question the mass-count distinction raises is: what cognitive or ontological 
distinction does it go along with? Srinivasan and Barner in their contribution to the volume 
approach the question from an empirical cognitive perspective, dealing with the phenomenon 
of object mass nouns as well as minimal pairs of a count and a mass noun that appear to stand 
for the very same entities (such as (English) hair (mass), Italian capelli (count)), quantitative 
comparisons (which for count nouns are number-based, but for mass nouns may be 
measurement- or number-based), and the acquisition of counting. They argue that countability 
conveyed by count nouns does not just depend on syntactic and lexical representation, but that 
additional conceptual and pragmatic factors come into play. Treves and Rothstein’s 
contribution falls within the same topic. Making use of a neural network and crosslinguistic 
findings, they argue against the common view of a binary distinction between semantic mass 
and count markers to correlate with the syntactic mass-count distinction; instead they favor a 
graded distribution of correlations. They also argue that, crosslinguistically, there are different 
ways for a noun to be situated on a graded scale between pure count and pure mass. Finally, 
they argue against a strict correlation between mass-count syntax and (standard) semantic 
distinctions, and in favor of viewing the syntactic mass-count distinction as encoding a 
perspectival contrast between entities presented grammatically as countable and entities 
presented as non-countable in a context. 
       Another question that the mass-count distinction raises is that of the classification of 
categories of number itself. Most of the literature is focused on the distinction between mass, 
singular count, and plural. Ojeda in his contribution to the volume elaborates with a range of 
crosslinguistic cases the richness and diversity of the category of number and proposes formal 
semantic analyses for different number categories using extensional mereology. The 
categories Ojeda discusses include the dual, the co-dual, the paucal, and the multal, and the 
universal number, a category of nouns that applies to both individuals and pluralities. The 
latter, surprisingly, is found in English as well, as Ojeda points out, namely in roots of nouns, 
which are used in compounds such a one-car garage, two-bedroom apartment, three-pound 
package. 
     The mass-count distinction with its opposition to classifier systems such as that of Chinese 
is not as clear-cut as it first might have seemed given a broader crosslinguistic perspective, 
which is what Bale and Gillon’s contribution is about. Bale and Gillon show that Western 
Armenian lacks a mass-count distinction, yet has plural marking with a completely optional 
use of classifiers. Morever, they give examples of languages (Ch’ol and Mi’gmaq) where 
classifiers are required by the use of certain numerals, but not by nouns themselves. They 
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suggest that the syntactic mass-count distinction may not go along with a semantic distinction 
at all, but rather is on a par with gender-marking. 
      The mass-count distinction has primarily been studied with respect to nouns for concrete 
objects, but not abstract nouns, such as hope and joy. Zamparelli’s contribution focuses on 
abstract mass nouns and the productive countability shifts they may undergo. 
Hinterwimmer’s contribution is a study of abstract mass nouns and their distinctive semantic 
behavior with respect to both mass and count quantifiers. 
     Mass nouns in English include one notoriously tricky subcategory, that of object mass 
nous mass nouns, mass nouns whose denotations appear to consist in pluralities of well-
distinguished individuals, such as furniture, police force, footwear, hardware. Cohen in her 
contribution points out that object mass nouns are obtained by various active morphological 
processes in English, French, and Hebrew and that this has consequences for how the 
semantics of such nouns is to be viewed. She suggests a perspectival semantics of object mass 
nouns, on which common functionality is emphasized and individual members are 
backgrounded. 
    Object mass nouns are also the focus of the contribution of Rothstein and Pires de 
Oliveira. They point out a fundamental difference in the way object mass nouns in 
comparatives behave in English and in Portuguese Brazilian. Whereas in English object mass 
nouns in comparatives are compared strictly numerically (John has more furniture than Bill), 
in Brazilian Portuguese such comparison may involve counting as well as measurement. 
Rothstein and de Oliveira give a semantic explanation for this difference.    
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